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MENTAL HEALTH-Clarifying Statutory and
Constitutional Guidelines for Involuntary
Civil Commitment Procedure Under the
Illinois Mental Health Code-
People v. Sansone
Gerald Sansone's story was a rather unusual one. He said that he
had been a United States Senator. Indeed, he claimed -that, as far back
as 1946, he was the only child lobbyist who had been in Washington
and had been written about in the papers. Later, he related more in-
formation about himself. He said that he had been a Speaker of the
House and had campaigned with John F. Kennedy for the vice-presi-
dency. He also said that his wife had been shot on the White House
lawn while he was a guard there, and, unfortunately, he had also been
shot-through the head. On another occasion he told a social worker
that he had been shot through the eye 4 years ago and that this oc-
curred every 4 years. Mr. Sansone later told a psychiatrist that he had
been arrested "by a cop who was crooked," while he was chasing
people from his property "on a federal order." He also told the social
worker that people had been trying to take his house away from him.
These statements form part of the testimony of experts' that was in-
troduced at the hearing in which Mr. Sansone was committed to a men-
tal hospital in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Illinois
Mental Health Code.2 The commitment order was appealed in People
v. Sansone.3 The resulting decision provides important but disturbing
guidelines concerning the interpretation of Mental Health Code com-
mitment requirements, especially when compared with standards of
due process as enunciated in other cases. Before these rulings are dis-
cussed, however, a short examination of commitment proceedings in
general, and of the Illinois Mental Health Code in particular, is needed
1. People v. Sansone, 18 Il. App. 3d 315, 318-19, 309 N.E.2d 733, 735-36 (1974).
2. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 912 (1973).
3. 18 IIl. App. 3d 315, 309 N.E.2d 733 (1974).
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in order to pinpoint the exact area of commitment law affected by the
Sansone decision.
COMMITMENT IN GENERAL
The commitment process, in a non-criminal sense,4 means "[a] pro-
ceeding for the restraining and confining of insane persons for their
own and the public's protection."'  Illinois, along with 18 other states
and the District of Columbia, has replaced the word "commitment"
with the more progressive term "hospitalization" 6 in its mental health
code. Commitment, or hospitalization, has traditionally been termed
civil, not necessarily because it is so different from criminal proceed-
ings (the similarity is an issue throughout Sansone), but simply to dis-
tinguish this type of proceeding from criminal commitment. Civil com-
mitment can be voluntary7 or involuntary; the former, by its nature,
presents far fewer procedural problems. The court in Sansone dealt
with involuntary civil commitments in Illinois.
The procedures governing involuntary hospitalization are almost en-
tirely statutory; each state sets up its own statutory scheme implement-
ing a variety of different procedures which result in different catego-
ries of involuntary hospitalization.8 The sections of the Illinois Mental
Health Code that deal with involuntary hospitalization provide for ad-
mission upon the certificate of a physician, emergency admission, and
admission upon a hearing and court order.9 Hospitalization upon the
certificate of a physician does not require an automatic hearing but
makes provisions for one upon request. 10 Emergency admission proce-
dures require a hearing after hospitalization." Both of these procedures
demand that the party be hospitalized immediately upon the presenta-
tion of the petition, while the third type, admission upon a hearing and
court order, requires that a complete hearing be held and a court order
4. As a general term in criminal proceedings, "commitment" means "[t]he warrant
. . . by which a court . . . directs an officer to take a person to prison." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 341 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
5. Id.
6. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION STUDY, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 34
& n.4 (S. Brakel & R. Rock ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION
STUDY]. These terms, commitment and hospitalization, are used synonymously through-
out this article.
7. Illinois provides for voluntary hospitalization; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 911/2, § 4-1
to 5-3 (1973).
8. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION STUDY, supra note 6, at 34, 41-59. These differing
categories are broadly distinguished by the type of hearing or by the probable term of
hospitalization. The types of hearings are either judicial or non-judicial. The terms of
hospitalization can be described as extended or short-term.
9. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 911/2, § 6-1 to 8-8 (1973).
10. Id. 99 6-1 to 6-6.
11. Id. § 7-6.
209
1975
Loyola University Law Journal
be issued before hospitalization can take place.12 The opinion in
Sansone discusses the emergency procedure, the procedure most open
to abuse, but the guidelines in Sansone can easily be applied to the
two other involuntary hospitalization procedures. The Sansone guide-
lines certainly will be applied to these latter situations, especially in
view of the lack of Illinois case law dealing with all of the involuntary
commitment procedures discussed above.
Emergency Commitment in Illinois
Although under common law any official or private person had the
right to detain a dangerous mentally ill person,' 3 40 states, including
Illinois, have enacted special statutory provisions for the emergency de-
tention of the mentally ill.14  In Illinois, article VII of the Mental
Health Code governs emergency procedures. Section 7-1"' provides
that detention is effected by a petition signed by any person, 18 or over,
who resides in the same county as the detainee. The petition must
assert that the detainee is either mentally retarded or in need of mental
treatment, and that immediate hospitalization is needed for ,the protec-
tion of the detainee or others. It must also contain facts upon which
the above conclusion is based and the names of witnesses who can
12. Id. §§ 8-1 to 8-8.
13. Ross, "HOSPITALIZING THE MENTALLY ILL-EMERGENCY AND TEMPORARY COM-
MITMENTS," CURRENT TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLATION 1955-56, at 461, 471-72 (1957).
14. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION STUDY, supra note 6, at 118, Table 3.11.
15. This section states:
When any person is or is asserted to be mentally retarded or in need of men-
tal treatment and in such a condition that immediate hospitalization is neces-
sary for the protection from physical harm of such person or others, any per-
son 18 years of age or older may, in the county where such person in need
of mental treatment or mentally retarded person resides or is found, present
to the superintendent of a hospital a petition stating the reasons for such con-
clusion. Such petition must also state the name and address of the spouse or
other nearest relative or, if none, of a friend of such person asserted to be in
need of mental treatment or mentally retarded, if known to petitioner and, if
not known, that diligent inquiry has been made to learn the name of such per-
sons; the name and address of the guardian, if any, of the person asserted to
be in need of mental treatment or mentally retarded; and the names of the wit-
nesses by which the facts asserted may be proved. The petition may be pre-
pared by the superintendent of any hospital, as well as by other persons. Such
petition must be accompanied by the certificate of a physician not an employee
of, or financially interested either directly or indirectly in, any licensed private
hospital in which hospitalization is sought, certifying that the person is in need
of immediate hospitalization is in need of mental treatment or is mentally re-
tarded and the reasons for such conclusion. If the person is asserted to be
mentally retarded, such certificate may be executed by a physician or psycholo-
gist. Such certificates must be based upon a personal examination of the per-
son asserted to be in need of mental treatment or mentally retarded, made not
more than 72 hours prior to admission. Upon presentation of the petition and
certificate to the superintendent, the patient may be admitted to or hospitalized
in a hopsital pending procedures specified in this Article.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 /, § 7-1 (1973).
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testify to these facts. The petition must be accompanied by a doctor's
certificate which states that immediate hospitalization is necessary.
The doctor's statements must be based upon a personal examination
of the detainee which took place within a 72 hour period prior to his
admission. 6
Besides the procedures discussed above, the Mental Health Code
also conatins several safeguards for the detainee after he is admitted
to the hospital. Section 7-41 requires that once a detainee is admitted
to the hospital, the detainee, his attorney, and his nearest relative must
receive copies of the petition and some form of notice advising them
that a hearing will be held within 5 days to determine the necessity
of further hospitalization. Another safeguard is provided by section
7- 5 .18 This provision requires that a psychiatrist examine the person
hospitalized within 24 hours of admission and certify him to be in need
of mental treatment. Finally, section 7-619 requires that copies of the
petition and physician's certificate be filed with the clerk of the appro-
priate county court within 24 hours after admission, so that a hearing
to determine whether the detainee shall remain hospitalized can be
held within 5 days as required by statute. The above procedure, with
some important exceptions, was followed in the hospitalization of Mr.
Sansone.
Emergency Commitment of Mr. Sansone
The original emergency petition to hospitalize Mr. Sansone was filed
by the Assistant Director of Social Services for the Psychiatric Institute
of the Circuit Court of Cook County. No witnesses capable of testify-
ing to the facts which would support the conclusion that Mr. Sansone
was in need of mental treatment were listed on the petition. Indeed,
no facts at all were listed which might have supported this conclusion.
Instead, the petitioner stated that emergency hospitalization was re-
quired because of the "history of behavior and psychological and psy-
16. Special provisions are provided if it is impossible to obtain the doctor's cer-
tificate. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 , §§ 7-2 to 7-3 (1973).
17. Id. § 7-4.
18. This section provides that:
As soon as possible, but not later than 24 hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays,
and holidays, after admission of a person pursuant to this Article, the superin-
tendent shall cause the patient to be examined by a psychiatrist, who may be
a member of the staff of the hospital but who may not be the physician who
executed the certificate relative to the patient. If the psychiatrist does not,
upon the basis of such examination, certify the patient to be a person in need
of mental treatment or mentally retarded the patient shall be released forth-
with.
Id. § 7-5.
19. Id. § 7-6.
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chiatric examination done on August 18, 1972 at the Psychiatric Insti-
tute of the Circuit Court of Cook County. ' 20  The petition also de-
clared -that a physician's certificate was attached, as required by Sec-
tion 7-1, but this certificate was never sent to the clerk of the court
as required by section 7-6, and it never became a part of the record
at Mr. Sansone's hearing. Finally, Mr. Sansone was examined at the
hospital within 24 hours of his admission, as required by section 7-5,
and the contents of the physician's certificate were read into 'the record
of the hearing.
The hearing itself was scheduled within the 5 day statutory limit of
section 7-6, but it was continued for 5 more days at the request of the
State's Attorney to allow a more thorough evaluation of Mr. Sansone's
condition. When the hearing was finally held, Mr. Sansone requested
that his attorney waive a jury trial and avoid further continuances be-
cause "he ha[d] been incarcerated for over a month [and had] been
going back and forth to mental hospitals; he want[ed] his freedom. 21
Two weeks prior to -the hearing in this case, in a similar hearing, Mr.
Sansone had been found not to be in need of mental treatment, so this
was actually Mr. Sansone's second hearing within 2 weeks. 22 The find-
ing of the first hearing was not allowed into evidence at the second
hearing. The only testimony at the second hearing was provided by
two state's witnesses: a psychiatrist who had examined Mr. Sansone
twice, and a social worker at the hospital where he was now being
held.23  Both testified to Mr. Sansone's cooperativeness and neither
could recall any violent incidents involving him. The psychiatrist could
give no probability or prediction concerning if or when Mr. Sansone
might become dangerous, and he merely stated that, "he [Sansone] might
go back -to the area again and start a fight with someone telling them
to clear off his property. 2 4  The court then found Mr. Sansone to be
in need of mental treatment and ordered his hospitalization.
Mr. Sansone appealed the court's commitment order on several dif-
ferent grounds which can be broadly divided into two groups: (1) is-
sues involving the state's failure to comply with article VII of the Il-
linois Mental Health Code concerning emergency admissions; and (2)
issues involving the state's failure to comply with the United States
Constitution as applied to procedural and substantive elements of
emergency admissions and involuntary civil commitment in general.
20. Record, Petition for Hospitalization.
21. Id. at 6.
22. Mr. Sansone had been incarcerated during the entire process.
23. The substance of their testimony can be found at p. 208 supra.
24. Record at 20.
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Naturally, these two areas are not mutually exclusive, but they are com-
partmentalized in this article for convenience of discussion. In decid-
ing -these issues, the court in People v. Sansone has established seven
important precedents regarding Illinois commitment. Some may be
successfully attacked,2 5 but all must be dealt with. The purpose of -this
article is to define the precedents, show the basis for them, and provide
a start -toward dealing with them.
COMPLIANCE WITH THE ILLINOIS MENTAL HEALTH CODE
Standard of Dangerous Conduct
Two elements must be alleged in the emergency hospitalization peti-
tion and proved at the hearing before hospitalization can be ordered.
The first element requires that the person be either "mentally retarded
or in need of mental treatment."2 6  Mr. Sansone was found to be in
the latter category. To determine that a person is in this category, i.e.,
in need of mental treatment, the court must find the person to be within
the statutory definition of that phrase as found in section 1-1 1 of the
Mental Health Code.2 7  In this section, it is stated that a person is
"in need of mental treatment if he is suffering from a mental disorder
and can be reasonably expected to physically injure himself or others."
Once these two findings are made, a person is determined to be in need
of mental treatment.
The second element requires that the person be "in such a condition
that immediate hospitalization is necessary for the protection from
physical harm of such person, or others. ' 28  More simply stated, this
requirement actually demands that the person be found to be danger-
ous. However, as noted in the previous paragraph, if one has been
found to be in need of mental -treatment, he, by definition, has been
25. For example, a habeas corpus proceeding, questioning the constitutionality of the
decisions reached in Sansone, has been initiated in the Federal District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois. United States ex rel. Sansone et al. (filed Aug. 23, 1972).
Several issues concerning commitment procedures were settled at pre-trial in favor of
the detainees. The sole issue remaining before the three-judge panel is whether a
person can be found to be dangerous without a finding of any prior dangrous act or
omission. See generally text accompanying notes 26 through 45 infra.
26. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91Y2, § 7-1 (1973).
27. Section 1-11 of the Mental Health Code defines a person in need of mental treat-
ment:
[A]ny person afflicted with a mental disorder, not including a person who is
mentally retarded, as defined in this Act, if that person, as a result of such
mental disorder, is reasonably expected at the time the determination is being
made or within a reasonable time thereafter to intentionally or unintentionally
physically injure himself or other persons, or is unable to care for himself so
as to guard himself from physical injury or to provide for his own physical
needs. This term does not include a person whose mental processes have
merely been weakened or impaired by reason of advanced years.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 9, § 1-11 (1973).
28. Id. § 7-1.
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found to be reasonably expected to injure himself or others. This also
is a finding of dangerousness. Thus, if a person has already been
found dangerous by proof of the first element, proof of the second
element, which also requires a finding of dangerousness, is a foregone
conclusion.2 9  Consequently, the first element, "in need of mental
treatment," is decisive, and the findings of "mentally disordered" and
"reasonably expected to injure" are what must be shown by the pros-
ecution in order to prove this element. The latter finding, the finding
of "dangerousness," was the one questioned by counsel for Mr. San-
sone on appeal.
The court in Sansone ruled that some prior harmful act or conduct
is not necessary to support a finding of dangerousness.30  The court,
however, failed to give independent clarification to the dangerousness
requirement of section 1-11.a' This is necessary to decide whether
a person can be "reasonably expected" to be dangerous if he has ex-
hibited no previous harmful conduct.
To answer this in the negative, the attorney for Mr. Sansone, in the
words of the appellee, "unleased a relentless attack against psychiatry,
labeling it 'an inexact science.' ",32 Recent research concerning the re-
liability of a diagnosis of potential dangerousness supports appellant's
contention that it is impossible to predict with certainty whether a per-
son will commit violent acts in the future when that person has no past
history of violence. At a recent meeting at the National Institute of
Mental Health, a group of noted behavioral scientists concluded that
no one knows how to predict dangerousness.33 Moreover, recent
studies have demonstrated that psychiatrists have no special expertise
in predicting dangerousness, 34 and that they tend to predict anti-social
conduct where it would not, in fact, occur. 35  Perhaps the science of
psychiatry is not wholly to blame for this situation, inasmuch as the
"dangerousness" concept itself has been criticized as ambiguous, inef-
29. If the first element proved is not "in need of mental treatment" but mentally
retarded then the second element would require independent proof.
30. 18 Il1. App. 3d at 323-24, 309 N.E.2d at 739.
31. See note 27 supra.
32. Brief for Appellee at 8.
33. 8 Psych. Today 36 (1974). See also Livermore, Malmquist, and Meehl, On the
Justification for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 75, 82 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Livermore].
34. Steadman, Some Evidence on the Inadequacy of the Concept and Determination
of Dangerousness in Law and Psychiatry, 1 J. PSYCH. & L. 409 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Steadman].
35. Dershowitz, The Psychiatrist's Power in Civil Commitment: A Knife that Cuts
Both Ways, 2 PSYCH. TODAY 32 (1969); see Hunt and Wiley, Operation Baxstrom After
One Year, 124 AMx J. PSYCH. 974 (1968); see also Morris, "Criminality" and the Right
to Treatment, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 784 (1969).
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fective, and so filled with false assumptions that, in application, it can
be manipulated to support any conclusion desired.3" With such an
amorphous standard to begin with, it is no wonder that elucidation of
the standard has proved difficult. This is especially unfortunate in
cases where there is no evidence of any prior dangerous conduct; the
lack of both scientific and legal guidelines regarding dangerousness
would seem to make an accurate prediction, in these cases, very un-
likely.3
7
Despite this evidence of the lack of predictive accuracy, courts in
their determination of dangerousness rely heavily on the recommenda-
tions of psychiatrists.38  This is borne out in the Sansone case. On
direct examination, the examining psychiatrist stated that Mr. Sansone
was dangerous and that "he needs to be in a hospital. ' 39  However,
on cross-examination the psychiatrist admitted that he could not, with
any certainty, predict if, when, or how Mr. Sansone might become dan-
gerous. Consequently, the fact that the psychiatrist testified that Mr.
Sansone should be hospitalized probably influenced the trial court more
than the uncertain testimony concerning Mr. Sansone's potential for
violence. A practical reason for this heavy reliance on psychiatric
recommendations by courts in general, and the Sansone court in par-
ticular, is that courts intuitively recognize the inadequacy of the danger-
ousness standard and their resultant inability to apply it, and thus com-
pensate by relying more heavily on the recommendation of the psychia-
trist in his role as expert witness.
Notwithstanding the above practical analysis, some courts have re-
cently become concerned with a more accurate application of the con-
cept of dangerousness. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia has attempted to provide an analytical framework that
would guide lower courts in applying the term "dangerous." The court
36. Steadman, supra note 34, at 425; R. ROCK, M. JACOBSON & R. JANOPAUL, Hos-
PITALIZATION AND DISCHARGE OF THE MENTALLY ILL 132-39 (1968); see also Livermore,
supra note 33. It should be noted that Illinois has attempted to solve this problem by
not including the word "dangerous" in section 1-11, and instead using the words "rea-
sonably expected to injure." This is certainly an improvement in clarity; but, courts that
have attempted to interpret a similar phrase, "likely to inflict injury," have run into the
same difficulties that an interpretation of "dangerousness" entails. See cases at notes
40, 42 infra. Also, the same problem of questionable predictability affects application
of the Illinois statute.
37. See generally Rappaport, Lassen, and Hay, A Review of the Literature on the
Dangerousness of the Mentally Ill, in THE CLINICAL EVALUATION OF THE DANGEROUS-
NESS OF THE MENTALLY ILL, 79 (J. Rappaport ed. 1967); cf. Livermore, supra note
33, at 83.
38. Steadman, supra note 34, at 421. This study of New York involuntary commit-
ments found an 87 per cent concurrence rate between psychiatric recommendations and
judicial decisions.
39. Record at 15.
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also has discussed what factors are necessary for a determination that
a person would be "likely" to cause injury, the essential element of
dangerousness.4" The United States Supreme Court, although not pin-
pointing the degree of certainty that is needed in a prediction of dan-
gerousness to constitutionally justify commitment, has nonetheless re-
quired that the "potential for doing harm . . . [be] great enough to
justify such a massive curtailment of liberty."'"
Finally, the District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin in
Lessard v. Schmidt,4 has stated that the Supreme Court standard
"implies a balancing test in which the state must bear the burden of
proving that there is an extreme likelihood that if the person is not
confined he will do immediate harm to himself and others."'" In
further defining the standards dealing with the predictability of dan-
gerousness, the Lessard court stated:
[A]lthough attempts to predict future conduct are always difficult,
and confinement based upon such a prediction must always be
viewed with suspicion, we believe civil confinement can be justified
in some cases if the proper burden of proof is satisfied and danger-
ousness is based upon a finding of a recent overt act, attempt or
threat to do substantial harm to oneself or another.44
In the above cases, statutes were being interpreted in light of the
requirements of due process. By interpreting the Illinois statute this
way, it seems safe to predict that future cases will require a higher
degree of certainty in determining that a person is dangerous and in
need of hospitalization than Sansone deemed necessary, especially as
future studies expand upon the inadequacy in the current methods of
predicting violent and aggressive behavior. However, it should be
noted that the Sansone standard is a negative one-a prior, overt, dan-
gerous act is not necessary before one can be reasonably expected to
injure himself or others. The Sansone opinion does not state what is
needed to determine if a person is dangerous, but it implies that very
little certainty is actually demanded.4
Failure to Meet Notice Requirements
Section 7-1 of the Mental Health Code requires that the petition con-
40. See Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Millard v. Harris, 406
F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
41. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
42. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
43. Id. at 1093.
44. Id. (emphasis added, citation omitted); see Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d 1095,
1102 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
45. 18 Ill. App. 3d at 323-24, 309 N.E.2d at 739.
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tain the names of witnesses who have knowledge of facts which can
prove that hospitalization of the individual named in the petition is
necessary, and also requires that the petition list these facts.46  The
petition to commit Mr. Sansone contained neither facts nor names. 47
The ensuing discussion concerns the Sansone court's handling of the
fact that the petition did not contain the witnesses' names as required
by section 7-1. The points raised in this discussion are also appli-
cable to the petition's failure to contain the requisite facts.
In ruling that the omission of names of witnesses was not a fatal
defect in the petition, the Sansone court relied heavily on the fact that
"upon [a] review of the totality of the circumstances," Mr. Sansone
was not prejudiced by the petition's failure to name witnesses' be-
cause he could:
have ascertained prior to the hearing who was to -testify, and his
counsel could have asked for a continuance if he were surprised by
'the witnesses' testimony. . . We note that counsel did not raise
an objection to the witnesses' testimony, and moreover, thoroughly
cross-examined them. 49
In effect, the court ruled that a failure to comply with ;the Mental
Health Code, in the absence of any showing of prejudice, is not fatal
to the petition.50
This determination by the Sansone court is not consistent with the
decisions reached by the Illinois Supreme Court when it discussed the
Sexually Dangerous Persons Act. In People v. Bruckman, 1 the Illinois
Supreme Court concluded that this Act should be strictly construed be-
cause of the nature of the proceedings under it and because of the pos-
sibility of indefinite confinement. 2 A proceeding under this Act is
involuntary civil commitment53 and thus is similar enough in nature to
the Sansone proceeding to justify the application of the strict construc-
tion rule ,to the Mental Health Code. Moreover, a perusal of the com-
plete emergency admissions procedure reveals numerous safeguards
that show a legislative intent to prevent any abuse of the commitment
process, and to provide a person named in an emergency petition with
46. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 911/2, § 7-1 (1973). For complete text, see note 15 supra.
47. The Sansone court dismissed the lack of facts by ruling that there was no viola-
tion of Mr. Sansone's due process rights. See text accompanying notes 76 through 85
in' ra.
48. 18 Il. App. 3d at 324-25, 309 N.E.2d at 740.
49. Id. (citation omitted).
50. Id. at 325, 309 N.E.2d at 740; see People v. Pelkola, 19 Ill. 2d 156, 166 N.E.2d
54 (1960).
51. 33 Ill. 2d 150, 210 N.E.2d 537 (1965).
52. Id. at 154, 210 N.E.2d at 540.
53. Id. at 151-52, 154, 210 N.E.2d at 539, 540.
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every possible protection that might be necessary to ensure a fair pro-
ceeding. Indeed, the Sansone court, in its opinion, stated that the
purpose of the procedures is to provide adequate safeguards against
unreasonable detention and commitment.54 Thus, there is strong legis-
lative and judicial incentive to strictly follow the procedure for commit-
ment as outlined in the Mental Health Code. Nevertheless, the San-
sone court ignored the protection provided by the Code's notice re-
quirements and ruled that the lack of the names of witnesses was not
fatally defective. Yet, requiring these names on the petition would
prevent the filing of ill-conceived petitions55 and would ensure the re-
spondent adequate preparation in his defense. It is questionable
whether a strict construction of the Code would make a failure to in-
clude the names of witnesses a fatal defect in all cases, but requiring
strict compliance with the statute would certainly maintain it as the
safeguard which the Sansone court said it was intended to be.
Form or Certification Needed to Conform to Section 7-5
Section 7-5 of the Mental Health Code requires that a psychiatrist
certify that the patient is a person in need of mental treatment within
24 hours after his admission. 56 Mr. Sansone was examined within this
time period, but he was not certified in the usual manner. The normal
form was not used, and nowhere on the certificate that was used did
the psychiatrist state that Mr. Sansone was "in need of mental treat-
ment."'57  The trial court determined that since Mr. Sansone had not
been released, he must have been found to be "in need of mental treat-
ment," despite the lack of any statement to this effect in the certifi-
cate.5 The Sansone court accepted the reasoning of the trial court
on this point. Therefore, under -this rationale, neither the appropriate
form nor words stating that the patient is "in need of mental treatment"
are required. Instead, if the patient is examined and not released, it
is to be assumed that he was so certified.
54. 18 Il. App. 3d at 322, 309 N.E.2d at 738.
55. The f.ling of the petition brings about automatic incarceration without bail for
at least 5 days.
56. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 911/,, § 7-5 (1973). For complete text, see note 18 supra.
57. Although the certificate itself was not entered into the record, its contents were
read into the record as follows:
Patient is cooperative during interview, he is orientated, able to answer ques-
tions but is somewhat agitated, appeared to be delusioned of grandiose nature.
According to him he was U.S. Senator and, as far back as 1946 he was the
only child lobbyist who was in Washington written about in newspapers. He
was about 14 years old then and the diagnosis is schizophrenic paranoid type.
18 Ill. App. 3d at 318, 309 N.E.2d at 735.
58. 18 Il. App. 3d at 327-28, 309 N.E.2d at 742.
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The above ruling obviously amounts to a presumption that if a per-
son is not released, he is "in need of mental treatment." This pre-
sumption effectively circumvents the explicit requirement of section 7-
5 as well as the intent of the legislature, which undoubtedly included
this section as a safeguard against unjustified hospitalization. More-
over, the certificate in Sansone cannot be construed in any way to con-
tain the elements that section 1-11 requires in its definition of "in need
of mental treatment," i.e., suffering from a mental disorder, and reason-
ably expected to cause injury.5 9 A mental disorder is mentioned in
the certificate, but nothing indicates an expectation of injurious con-
duct.60 Even though this element was also missing from the certificate,
the Sansone court concluded that the certificate was not defective.
This further demonstrates that if a person has not been released, a pre-
sumption is created that he is in need of mental treatment.
Perhaps this presumption can be attacked on strict construction or
legislative intent grounds. More probably, it can be distinguished upon
the facts, thus keeping section 7-5 as the safeguard it was intended
to be. Whether successfully attacked or distinguished upon the facts,
however, the Sansone court's ruling that a person is presumed to be
in need of mental treatment if not released is clearly in conflict with
the explicit provisions of section 7-5 that establish the certification re-
quirements. Consequently, future decisions by Illinois courts should
adhere more closely to the provisions of this section in order that it
be maintained as a safeguard against groundless commitment.
One final note is necessary concerning the requirement of section
7-6 that copies of the petition and physician's certificate of section 7-
1 be filed with the clerk of the court in which the hearing is to take
place. 61  In Mr. Sansone's case, the original physician's certificate
which accompanied the petition was never filed. The court in Sansone
"share[d] the trial court's concern in this matter," 62 and recommended
that the statutory procedure be followed. The court also urged that
the psychiatrist's certificate of section 7-5 be filed, even though this
is not statutorily required, so that the adequacy of the documents could
be determined. 63  However, the court felt that the missing documents
concerning Mr. Sansone clearly had been before the trial court, and
the fact that these documents were not filed and not available for exam-
59. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91%, § 1-11 (1973). For complete text, see note 27 supra.
60. See note 57 supra.
61. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 1 9,, § 7-6 (1973).
62. 18 Ill. App. 3d at 328, 309 N.E.2d at 742.
63. Id.
219
1975
Loyola University Law Journal
ination on appeal did not constitute reversible error. Thus, despite
emphasizing the importance of filing these documents, the Sansone
court ignored its own recommendations and established a precedent
that would allow all future courts to ignore the provisions of section
7-6.
COMPLIANCE WITH CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS
Standard of Dangerous Conduct
The Sansone court stated that the trial court's failure to base its find-
ing that Mr. Sansone was dangerous on a prior overt act did not violate
Mr. Sansone's due process rights.64 Counsel for appellant, on appeal,
argued that since no accurate prediction of dangerousness could be
made, Mr. Sansone was being detained solely because of his status as
a person suffering from a mental disorder. He further contended that
this was an unconstitutional violation of Mr. Sansone's due process
rights, especially when considered in the light of the magnitude of dan-
ger necessary to justify preventive detention.6" The court, in response
to this argument, distinguished between detention for criminal punish-
ment and detention for medical treatment. It emphasized that under
the parens patriae theory, the purpose of commitment is to provide the
individual with psychiatric treatment and thus is not involved with the
traditional controversy of preventive detention66 which historically has
been centered around the issue of bail.6 7  This distinction is valid, and
the preventive detention argument does not seem applicable to invol-
untary civil commitment, even if not based upon some prior dangerous
conduct. 68 The court's reasoning involving the parens patriae theory,
however, is not exact, and bears some examination.
When one is hospitalized to prevent self-injury, the basis for the hos-
pitalization is the state's power to take care of those who are a danger
to themselves-the parens patriae power. However, if one is hos-
64. 18 111. App. 3d at 323-24, 309 N.E.2d at 739.
65. Brief for Appellant at 14-21. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962);
Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
66. 18 Ill. App. 3d at 322-23, 309 N.E.2d at 739.
67. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
68. But see Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d 1095, 1101-1104 (D.C. Cir. 1969). In apply-
ing criminal preventive detention theory to civil commitment, the court stated:
But when a determination of 'dangerousness' will result in a deprivation of lib-
erty, no court can afford to ignore the very real constitutional problems sur-
rounding incarceration predicated only upon a supposed propensity to commit
criminal acts. Incarceration may not seem 'punishment' to the jailors, but it
is punishment to the jailed. Incarceration for a mere propensity is punishment
not for acts, but for status, and punishment for status is hardly favored in our
society. In essence, detention for status is preventive detention (footnotes
omitted).
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pitalized to protect others, i.e., society, the'state is acting under its po-
lice power."9 Even if confinement under the parens patriae power
brings with it an inherent right to treatment70 as the Sansone court sug-
gests, 71 this confinement provides no guarantee for those like Mr. San-
sone, who was arguably hospitalized under the police power, that they
will receive treatment.72 Also, even if a person was hospitalized under
the parens patriae power, the promise of treatment that would at best
be ineffective, and in many cases harmful,"3 would certainly not justify
a relaxation of due process. 74  "The admonition to function in a 'par-
ental' relationship is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness. ' 71
Consequently, the Sansone court's use of parens patriae to authorize
Mr. Sansone's confinement, without extrinsic proof of prior acts of
violence, is not justified.
Failure to Meet Notice Requirements
Section 7-1 of the Mental Health Code requires that the petition in-
clude facts which support the conclusion that immediate hospitalization
of the individual is necessary; the names of witnesses who can -testify
to these facts is also required. 6
The Sansone court excuses the failure to cite the requisite facts in
the petition on the ground -that this failure did not violate ,the due proc-
ess notice requirement." This decision resulted from the application
of an equivocal standard, indefinite in detail, which was used by the
United States Supreme Court as a standard in newspaper publication
problems in civil suits."
However, recent decisions point to stricter due process requirements
of notice in proceedings that are similar to civil commitment. The Su-
69. Comment, The New Mental Health Codes: Safeguards in Compulsory Commit-
ment and Release, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 977, 981 (1967).
70. See Livermore, supra note 33, at 93 n.53; Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment,
53 VA. L. REV. 1134, 1140 (1967); Comment, Due Process for All-Constitutional
Standards for Involuntary Civil Commitment and Release, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 633
(1967); cf. Sarzen v. Gaughan, 489 F.2d 1076, 1086 (1st Cir. 1973).
71. 18 Il. App. 3d at 322, 309 N.E.2d at 738.
72. The only danger mentioned was that Mr. Sansone "might start a fight with some-
one telling them to clear off his property." Thus, he could have been hospitalized either
to protect others, or himself.
73. See E. GOFFMAN, AsYLUMS (1962).
74. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1087 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
75. Kent v. United States, 383 US. 541, 555 (1966).
76. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91%, § 7-1 (1973).
77. 18 1l1. App. 3d at 324, 309 N.E.2d at 740.
78. The Sansone opinion used as its standard: notice reasonably calculated, under
all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford
them an opportunity to present their objections. Id.; see Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38
(1972).
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preme Court has required that notice in juvenile proceedings set forth,
in writing, the specific charges or factual allegations to be considered
at the hearing. 9 Following this precedent, the court, in Lessard v.
Schmidt,8" defined standards for civil commitment procedure which re-
quired more than what the court in Sansone felt was sufficient to satisfy
due process notice requirements. The Lessard court stated:
Notice of date, time and place is not satisfactory. The patient
should be informed of the basis for his detention, his right to
jury trial, the standard upon which he may be detained, the
names of examining physicians and all other persons who may
testify in favor of his continued detention, and the substance of
their proposed testimony.8
Although this is the strictest standard yet imposed by a court, the Il-
linois statutory requirements are basically the same as the Lessard
standard. Yet, the Sansone court held that neither facts nor witnesses
were necessary to ensure effective notice and a resultant fair proceed-
ing. Consequently, the validity of the Sansone court's holding can
seriously be questioned due to the court's failure to effectively deal
with Mr. Sansone's due process arguments. Future Illinois courts will
surely demand stricter compliance with notice requirements than the
Sansone court did.
The decision in this case might be further distinguishable by future
courts for the following reason. At the hearing, the parties agreed to
orally amend the petition to stipulate that Mr. Sansone was delusional,
confused, and had impaired judgment.82  Prior to this amendment,
the petition only contained conclusions and stated no facts to justify
emergency hospitalization,83 as respondent successfully established.
The hearing judge demanded facts upon which a case could be argued.
The state offered a continuance, but because of respondent's desire for
an immediate trial,84 respondent accepted the above amendment to the
petition, although he then unsuccessfully attacked this as conclusion-
ary.85  Although it certainly can be debated whether even the
amended petition contained sufficient facts to justify hospitalization, the
leave to amend and acquiescence by respondent could have convinced
the Sansone court that respondent suffered no prejudice, and, con-
sequently, his due process rights were not violated.
79. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967).
80. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
81. Id. at 1092.
82. 18 Ill. App. 3d at 318, 309 N.E.2d at 735.
83. See note 57, supra.
84. See text accompanying notes 21-22 supra.
85. Record at 10.
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The Standard of Proof in Commitment Proceedings
The question of what standard of proof is required by due process
in involuntary civil commitment proceedings has caused a great amount
of legal discussion and engendered an increasing number of decisions
dealing with this issue.8 6  Courts have had to choose between the civil
standard of proof-by a preponderance of the evidence-and the crim-
inal standard of proof-beyond a reasonable doubt. The court in
Sansone opted for a median, requiring proof by clear and convincing
evidence.8 7  To evaluate this decision, the commitment proceeding it-
self must be examined to determine its nature, and then to determine
the burden of persuasion that is appropriate to justify commitment.
Commitment proceedings are not civil in title only. The Mental
Health Code provides for appeal from final orders or judgments "as
in other civil cases."88  It also provides that judicial proceedings con-
ducted under it shall generally be conducted in accordance with the
Civil Practice Act. 9 In interpreting this statute, the Illinois Supreme
Court held commitment proceedings under the Mental Health Code
to be civil in nature.9" Thus, in Illinois, there is statutory and judicial
precedent for asserting that commitment proceedings are civil in
nature.
On the other hand, the end result of a successful commitment pro-
ceeding, incarceration, points to the criminal nature of the proceed-
ings. In deciding what standard of proof due process would require
in a commitment proceeding, the fact that an individual's freedom is
at stake should be of paramount importance.9 The United States Su-
preme Court has applied this principle to proceedings, like commit-
ment, which contain a mixture of civil and criminal traits92 and has con-
cluded that proof by a preponderance of the evidence does not measure
up to due process standards. Specifically, in 1966, the Court, in
Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,9" held that the
86. See cases cited in notes 92, 99, 101, and 110 infra.
87. 18 Ill. App. 3d at 326, 309 N.E.2d at 741.
88. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91%, § 2-3 (1973).
89. Id. § 13-1.
90. People ex rel. Keith v. Keith, 38 Ill. 2d 405, 231 N.E.2d 387 (1967).
91. Ci. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958).
92. The Supreme Court had seemed ready to decide the requisite standard of proof
in civil commitment cases, after the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion
by Judge Haynsworth, ruled that the state must prove its case by a preponderance of
the evidence. However, Maryland began a substantial revision of its commitment laws,
and since the case involved the Maryland commitment statute, the Supreme Court dis-
missed the case. Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed
as improvidently granted sub nom. Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U.S.
355 (1972).
93. 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
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deprivation of liberty involved in deportation made it impermissible
to banish an individual "from this country upon no higher degree of
proof than applies in a negligence case."9 4 Instead, the Court required
proof by "clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence."95  Six years
later, in In re Winship,96 the Court held that proof beyond a reasonable
doubt was required to prove every fact necessary in juvenile delin-
quency proceedings.9 7  In justifying this standard, the Court empha-
sized the loss of liberty and reputation resulting from a successful pros-
ecution by the state in a juvenile proceeding. 98 The district court in
Lessard v. Schmidt9" applied these principles to civil commitment pro-
ceedings. It noted that the loss of liberty in commitment is as great
as in a juvenile conviction and greater than in deportation. The court
also noted that the danger of being stigmatized is greater in commit-
ment than in juvenile proceedings because the latter proceedings are
confidential. Finally, the Lessard court concluded that due process re-
quires proof beyond a reasonable doubt in civil commitment proceed-
ings.100
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in In re Ballay,'0' has
provided the most exhaustive examination yet regarding standards of
proof in commitment proceedings. It concluded "that proof of mental
illness and dangerousness in involuntary civil commitment proceedings
must be beyond a reasonable doubt."'102  The court based its reason-
ing on an analytical framework used by the Supreme Court in Morris-
sey v. Brewer" 3 to decide what process is due in parole proceedings.
In Morrissey, the Court determined that the interests of the state and
individual must be examined when deciding what standard of proof
should be used.' The Ballay court analyzed the interests of the state
in commitment and found these to be similar to the interests served
by incarceration resulting from criminal proceedings.' 05 Then, in ana-
94. id. at 285.
95. Id.
96. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
97. Id. at 372.
98. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966).
99. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
100. Id. at 1094-95.
101. 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
102. Id. at 650.
103. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
104. [C]onsideration of what procedures due process may require under any
given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise na-
ture of the government function involved as well as of the private interest that
has been affected by government action.
Id. at 481.
105. The goals of incarceration through the criminal system were identified as deter-
rence, rehabilitation, physical removal from society, and to a decreasing extent, retribu-
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lyzing the interests of the individual, the court relied on the two factors
of Winship, loss of liberty and stigmatization, 00 and found these iden-'
tical to the interests an individual has at stake in a criminal proceed-
ing.1" 7  Finally, the court studied the three standards of proof in terms
of the interests involved, and quoted the Supreme Court by stating:
[W]here the interests of society are pitted against an individual
who "has at stake an interest of transcending value--as a criminal
defendant his liberty - this margin of error is reduced as to him
by the process of placing on the other party the burden of . . .
persuading the factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt."'10 8
Regarding the applicability of the clear and convicing evidence stand-
ard announced in Sansone, the Ballay court felt that this applies "in
situations where the various interests of society are pitted against re-
strictions on the liberty of the individual,"'0 9 such as deportation; it is
not appropriate in situations where there is a complete loss of liberty,
as in civil commitment.
These cases raise the question of whether the standard adopted by
the Sansone court will be accepted by future courts. Clearly, commit-
ment based upon a finding on the preponderance of the evidence is
a violation of due process and the trend is toward a stricter standard.
Few courts have adopted the stricter standard required by Lessard and
Ballay. 10 The Supreme Court has found the clear and convincing
standard useful in certain areas and might not be opposed to its use
in civil commitment proceedings."' However, proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, if required, would have the added advantage of allevi-
ating the problem of the lack of certainty in psychologically predicting
dangerous conduct, especially when no prior, overt, dangerous act has
been used as the basis for the prediction." 2  Unless psychological
methods are dramatically improved, some previous dangerous conduct
tion. Of these, commitment shares the goals of rehabilitation and physical removal
from society. 482 F.2d at 657.
106. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1972).
107. The individual's interest in freedom was deemed obvious. The degree of stig-
matization associated with mental illness was explained by the court in a note: "We
cannot ignore. the striking example of this attitude displayed by news stories and public
reaction to disclosures made by a recent vice-presidential aspirant." 482 F.2d at 668
n.2.
108. Id. at 662; see Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958).
109. 482 F.2d at 662.
110. See In re Pickles' Petition, 170 So. 2d 603 (Fla. App. 1965); Denton v. Com-
monwealth, 383 S.W.2d 681 (Ky. 1964); Ex Parte Perry, 137 N.J. Eq. 161, 43 A.2d
885 (1945); cf. Stachulak v. Coughlin, 369 F. Supp. 628 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
Ill. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 291 (1971); Woodby v. Immigration
& Naturalization Service, 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
112. In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 665-67 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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should probably be considered necessary for a finding that a person
is reasonably expected to injure himself or others. Thus, because of
both the importance of the interests involved and the uncertainty in
predictions of dangerous conduct, future courts seeking to ensure the
greatest degree of protection for those whose liberty is at stake in a
commitment hearing will require that the state prove its case beyond
a reasonable doubt.
Multiple Commitment Proceedings
Two weeks prior to the hearing in the present case, Mr. Sansone
had undergone another hearing on the question of whether he needed
to be committed. In this proceeding, the question had been answered
negatively. 113  The Sansone court held -that these multiple commitment
proceedings were not a violation of due process, thus deciding an issue
not placed before it. The court cited Gomes v. Gaughan,"4 and stated
that a misue of multiple commitment proceedings would violate due
process. The Sansone court then determined that in Mr. Sansone's
case there had been no such misuse. It emphasized that the length
of time intervening between the two hearings indicated that there was
a fresh and independent diagnosis of Mr. Sansone's mental condi-
tion."' The Mental Health Code seems to support this ruling, inas-
much as the issue of dangerousness is stated in terms of being rea-
sonably expected to cause injury "at the time the determination is being
made or within a reasonable time thereafter."' 1 6  Strictly construed,
this provision could be interpreted to allow a new hearing every day,
because the issue, involving a state of mind at the time the hearing
takes place, would never be the same. But under Gomes, multiple
commitment proceedings based on this reasoning would certainly be
a misuse of the commitment process. 117
However, the misuse need not be this blatant to be detected. The
facts of Gomes show that Mr. Sansone's multiple commitment proceed-
ings could be viewed as a violation of due process. The petitioner in
Gomes had been convicted of criminal assault with intent to rape in
113. On appeal, it was argued that the two hearings resulted in a violation of the
fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy. The Sansone opinion dismissed this
argument on the theory that commitment is a civil proceeding, at which all criminal
safeguards are not required. Any doubts engendered by this iuling would be based upon
the questionable nature of commitment proceedings, as discussed in text accompanying
notes 88 through 109 supra.
114. 471 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1973).
115. 18 Ill. App. 3d at 327, 309 N.E.2d at 742.
116. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 911/2, § 1-11 (1973).
117. 471 F.2d at 797.
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1962. Although the parties stipulated in a parallel commitment hear-
ing that he was sexually dangerous, no finding regarding this fact was
entered and the court applied the criminal sentence. In 1967, he was
found to be sexually dangerous in a commitment hearing and trans-
ferred from prison to a hospital. On review, the court found no due
process violation, but qualified its holding by stating, "had the peti-
tioner been found not sexually dangerous in the 1962 proceeding, a
question might arise whether another . . .hearing in the absence of
intervening misbehavior was so unfair as to violate due process."118 In
other words, if a previous commitment proceeding resulted in a finding
that the person was not sexually dangerous, and if 7 years later another
commitment proceeding resulted in an opposite finding without any in-
tervening misbehavior, then the Gomes court felt that a question
might arise concerning whether the individual's due process rights have
been violated.
This is exactly what happened to Mr. Sansone, except that the inter-
val between hearings was not 7 years, but 2 weeks. It is to the Sansone
court's credit that it recognized that a question had arisen as to whether
Mr. Sansone's due process rights had been violated. Nevertheless, in
applying the Gomes court's rationale to Mr. Sansone's case, the San-
sone court failed to find important the difference between the 7 year
interval of Gomes and the 2 week interval of Sansone. The Sansone
court emphasized the fresh examination of the question of Mr. San-
sone's mental condition that was provided by the second hearing,1"9
when it should have instead been questioning the need for another
hearing after 2 weeks, especially since there was no intervening be-
havior by Mr. Sansone which might have put the result of the first hear-
ing in doubt.
Extending the Sansone reasoning to its logical extreme, it can be
inferred that if the state had failed to commit Mr. Sansone in the sec-
ond hearing, 2 weeks later it could have petitioned again, and every
2 weeks thereafter, until he was committed. Certainly, courts would
check such an obvious abuse, but a violation of due process should be
determined by examining the time interval between the first two hear-
ings, not by looking at the number of hearings. The Sansone court
failed to apply the Gomes rationale and ignored the obvious violation
of due process presented by only a 2 week interval between hearings.
In applying the Sansone precedent, future Illinois courts should be
118. Id.
119. 18 111. App. 3d at 327, 309 N.E.2d at 742.
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more wary of multiple commitment proceedings. Despite the San-
sone logic, closer scrutiny by these courts may find a violation of due
process where multiple hearings, separated by only 2 weeks, have
entered contradictory findings on the question of commitment.
CONCLUSION
The precedents set by People v. Sansone are magnified in import-
ance by the lack of judicial precedent in Illinois interpreting the Mental
Health Code. Reasons for this lack of precedent stem from the fact
that the Code, in its present form, was only recently enacted and from
the fact that there has been a lack of interest in applying due process
standards to civil commitment procedures.
The broad scope of the Sansone precedents also magnifies the im-
portance of the case. The issues decided concern the complete process
of commitment proceedings, starting from ,the petition which initiates
the action and extending to the final order which is entered at the close
of the hearing. A broad scope is not only provided by the wide area
of concern of the Sansone precedents in commitment proceedings, but
also by the different bases for the precedents. The Sansone rulings
involve questions of compliance with statutory procedures as well as
questions of compliance with constitutional due process requirements.
Moreover, although the case ostensibly applies to emergency admis-
sions, its precedents are applicable, and certainly will be applied, to
every type of involuntary commitment under the Mental Health Code.
In evaluating the success of the Sansone court in dealing with this
broad array of commitment issues, the change in attitude toward com-
mitment must be considered. Originally, those unfortunate enough to
have been committed were considered akin to criminals, and yet safe-
guards guaranteed to accused criminals were never accorded to
them. 120 As the social status of the mentally ill has evolved from convict
to patient, the procedures used in dealing with -them have acquired
greater criminal safeguards. As a result, two contradictory trends have
emerged. The mentally ill person is being treated less like a criminal,
but the procedure dealing with him is becoming more criminal in na-
ture. The probable underlying reason for this is the awareness of
courts concerning the inadequacy of psychological methods when diag-
nosing and treating the mentally ill, and their recognition that greater
legal protection is necessary for the sake of those whose liberty is at
120. See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION STUDY, supra note 6, at 34. See also A.
DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA (2d ed. 1949).
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stake in commitment proceedings. Of course, the trend -toward stricter
requirements of due process in all areas where an individual's freedom
is at issue has also contributed to ihe greater protection accorded to
those facing commitment. In any case, the decision in Sansone can
only be evaluated in light of this movement toward greater legal protec-
tion for the mentally ill in general and stricter safeguards for those in-
volved in commitment proceedings in particular.
In dealing with due process questions, the Sansone court declined
to follow the courts which have extended the strict standards of criminal
due process to commitment proceedings. The interpretation of what
process is due regarding notice, former jeopardy, and standard of proof
was certainly not visionary, and unfortunately, at times, was marked
by a lack of deep concern for the rights of the individual. In these
respects, future courts will probably go beyond what Sansone has
required.
But Sansone is even more disturbing in what it demands for com-
pliance with the requirements of the Illinois Mental Health Code. It
certainly ignores the spirit, if not the letter of the law by consistently
allowing less than strict compliance with the provisions involved. The
Illinois legislature, through the Code, has provided the tools for an en-
lightened approach to mental problems, where the interests of the state
in the protection of all members of society and the interests of the in-
dividual in protecting his liberty and good name are both provided for.
All that is needed are courts with sufficient vision to use these tools
to erect a law of mental health which could provide those in the future,
like Mr. Sansone, with not merely minimal, but the highest degree of
protection of their basic rights.
RIcHARD J. CREMIEUX
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